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BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: MORE THAN FORTY YEARS 
OF ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION & THE CASE FOR 
PRIVATIZATION OF EDUCATION 
ROBERT W. MCGEE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education1 in 1954.  In 
Brown, the Court held that segregation of children in public schools on the ba-
sis of race deprives them of equal educational opportunities.2  While this 
landmark case set a precedent in favor of equal educational opportunity, it re-
ally asked the wrong question.  Rather than asking if separate education can be 
equal education, the real question is whether government should be involved 
in education in the first place.  Part II of this paper reviews the Brown deci-
sion.  Part III presents the case that, from a utilitarian perspective, the public 
would be better off if all education were private because the private sector can 
provide a higher quality education at a lower cost, without depriving children 
from poor families from receiving an education that is at least as good as what 
they are presently receiving from government schools.  Part IV makes the ar-
gument that, regardless of the relative quality or cost of government versus 
private education, providing education is not a legitimate function of govern-
ment because it violates the rights to property.  Part V discusses educational 
voucher plans, and concludes that government support for education should be 
abolished as soon as possible. 
II.  THE BROWN DECISION 
The Brown Court held that separate but equal in the field of public educa-
tion has no place.3  Segregation in public education violates the equal protec-
 
 *  Robert W. McGee is president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research and a 
Professor at Seton Hall University.  He has authored or edited more than 40 books and mono-
graphs and has written more than 300 articles and reviews for various scholarly and professional 
journals.  The author would like to thank John Tortora, who helped gather research material for 
this article. 
 1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Id. at 493. 
 3. This view has not been consistently followed in practice.  For example, all-black frater-
nities are acceptable but all-white fraternities are not.  All-black colleges are acceptable but all-
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tion of the laws.4  This case has had far-reaching implications and has influ-
enced the content of numerous civil rights acts.5 
The Brown case consolidated several cases from Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia and Delaware that dealt with the same issue.6  In the Kansas case, the 
plaintiffs were elementary school age negro7 children who resided in Topeka, 
Kansas.  They brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a law that permitted, but 
did not require, cities with more than 15,000 people to maintain separate 
school facilities for negro and white students.8 
The Topeka Board of Education established segregated elementary schools 
pursuant to that statute.  The District Court held that segregation in public 
schools has a detrimental effect on negro children, but denied relief because 
the facilities, quality of teachers, and so forth furnished to the colored students 
was comparable to the facilities enjoyed by the white students.9  It held that 
due process of law was not violated unless there was discrimination in the 
maintenance of the segregated schools.10  The Court, thus, upheld the “sepa-
rate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,11 which held that segregation 
was constitutional as long as both groups enjoyed substantially equal facilities.  
While Plessy involved equality in transportation facilities, the separate but 
equal doctrine has since been applied in a number of other areas, including 
public education. 
 
white colleges are not.  Scholarship funds that are set aside just for blacks are acceptable, but 
scholarship funds for whites only are not.  For more on the controversy regarding minority schol-
arships, see Rachel Spector, Minority Scholarships: A New Battle in the War on Affirmative Ac-
tion, 77 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1991). 
 4. 347 U.S. at 495. 
 5. See Noel Myricks, Brown Revisited: Twenty-Five Years Later, 7 BLACK L.J. 296 (1981). 
 6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 
920 (S.C. 1952); Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (Va. 1952); Gebhart v. Belton, 
91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952). 
 7. The courts use the words “negro” and “colored” to describe the plaintiffs in this case.  
Some present-day individuals would be offended by the use of these words, and would prefer to 
use “African-American” instead.  The author has refrained from the use of “African-American” 
for several reasons.  For one thing, it is too long.  It is also historically inaccurate because the 
court did not use this term when referring to plaintiffs.  Also, African-American refers to geogra-
phy rather than race or skin color.  To be consistent, one would have to refer to whites as Irish-
Americans, German-Americans, and so forth, which is burdensome and unnecessary.  African-
American is also insufficiently precise because the cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa are much dif-
ferent than the cultures of North Africa.  A more precise but still suboptimal term to use for the 
plaintiffs in this case would be Sub-Saharan Americans, which more closely pinpoints the geo-
graphic location from which their ancestors came. 
 8. See Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 797. 
 9. Id. at 800. 
 10. Id. at 797. 
 11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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The Supreme Court in Brown overturned that doctrine and held that sepa-
rate cannot be equal even if the facilities are comparable. 
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race even 
though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, de-
prive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunity?  We 
believe that it does.12 
Numerous articles have been written about this case in the last 40 years, 
and no attempt will be made here to duplicate or summarize those efforts.13  
But one aspect of this case has been sorely neglected – whether government 
should be involved in education in the first place.  It is this question that this 
article will address. 
III.  A UTILITARIAN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
A.  Some Economics 
Government has a monopoly in education, at least as far as poor children 
are concerned.14  A monopolist, by definition, is the sole provider of a product 
or service.15  Since poor children cannot afford to go to a non-government 
school, they are stuck doing business with the sole provider of education that 
they can afford, the government.  Even middle-income parents often do not 
have a choice because they have limited funds available for the education of 
their children.  Only the wealthy have a choice because they can afford to send 
their children to the school of their choice, even if they are also forced to pay 
for a school system that they do not use.16 
 
 12. 347 U.S. at 493. 
 13. See, e.g., Myricks, supra note 5; Bayard Rustin, Integration and Education: 25 Years 
After Brown, 23 HOWARD L.J. 89 (1980); Donald E. Lively, Separate But Equal: The Low Road 
Reconsidered, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.  43 (1986); Kenneth F. Ripple, Thurgood Marshall and 
the Forgotten Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW.  471 (1980); Der-
rick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 14. State regulation of primary and secondary schooling, and the restrictions on educational 
practice that result from it, is detrimental to the general public, minorities and the disadvantaged.  
See THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Robert B. Everhart ed., 1982). 
 15. The standard definition of a monopolist is someone who is the sole provider of a product 
or service for which there is no close substitute.  McConnell and Brue give a somewhat different 
definition.  They define monopoly as “the situation wherein the number of sellers becomes small 
enough for each seller to influence total supply and therefore the price of the commodity being 
sold.”  CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONOMICS 87-88 (11th ed. 1990).  
Other economists would argue that this definition better describes oligopoly. 
 16. Forcing people to pay for something they do not use violates fundamental fairness.  
Much can be said about this point, but it is not discussed here. 
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B.  Cost 
There is much empirical evidence to suggest that the market can do almost 
anything cheaper than the government.17  The worldwide movement toward 
privatization of government services provides numerous examples of this phe-
nomenon.18  Municipal solid waste disposal costs 61% to 71% more when 
done by government.19  It takes 68% more federal government employees to 
remove 21% as much railroad track as private sector employees over the same 
period of time and under similar conditions.20  Private companies can build 
prisons for 25% less than government, and they can do it in less than one year, 
compared to as much as five years for government.21  A study of 121 cities in 
the Los Angeles County area found that contracting out street cleaning to the 
private sector saves an average of 43%.22  The savings in other areas are also 
substantial: 73% for janitorial services, 42% for refuse collection, 56% for 
traffic signal maintenance, 96% for asphalt overlay construction, 40% for grass 
maintenance and 37% for street maintenance.23  Private fire companies have a 
faster response time and cost about half as much as government fire depart-
ments.24  Numerous other examples could be given to support the position that 
the private sector can do any number of things much cheaper than government, 
from police protection25 and the criminal justice system26 to emergency ambu-
lance service,27 leisure and recreational services,28 transit systems,29 social ser-
 
 17. For case studies to support this view, contact the Local Government Center, c/o Reason 
Foundation, 3415 South Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 400, Los Angeles, CA  90034. 
 18. See OLIVER LETWIN, PRIVATISING THE WORLD: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVATISATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1988)(giving examples of privatization in countries 
other than the United States). 
 19. EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 93 (1982).  Other studies arrive 
at different percentages, although they all seem to conclude that the private sector can provide the 
service at substantially less cost than government.  Contracting out waste collection to the private 
sector saves between 22% and 30%, according to another study.  Barbara J. Stevens, Solid Waste 
Management, in PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK: COMPETING FOR A BETTER FUTURE 215-53 
(1992)(A report of the New York State Senate Advisory Commission on Privatization). 
 20. See RANDALL FITZGERALD, WHEN GOVERNMENT GOES PRIVATE: SUCCESSFUL 
ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC SERVICES 17 (1988).  In Fitzgerald’s example, it took 129 Amtrak 
employees to remove 71.8 miles of track in the same time it took 77 private railroad employees to 
remove 344 miles of track.  Id. 
 21. Id.  Private companies can also operate prisons cheaper and provide a higher quality 
product.  See CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS (1990). 
 22. JOHN C. GOODMAN, PRIVATIZATION 119 (1985). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 122.  See also FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 72, 75-79. 
 25. ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL 37-50 (1980). 
 26. Id. at 51-61. 
 27. Id. at 79-87. 
 28. Id. at 99-109. 
 29. POOLE, supra note 25, at 110-125. 
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vices and health care,30 planning and zoning,31 public works,32 and city man-
agement.33  Why should the private provision of education be any different?  
In fact, numerous studies show that privatizing education will result in cost 
savings and quality improvement.  One New York State study reached the fol-
lowing conclusion: 
Although the goal of educational choice is to give our children a better educa-
tion, it would also eliminate stultifying and expensive educational bureaucra-
cies and may yield significant savings.  While these are very difficult to esti-
mate, some proponents reason as follows: Superior education is achieved in 
private schools where the per-pupil cost is less than half the cost in public 
schools.  New York spent $7,338 per pupil in 1989.  Therefore, if the national 
experience can be replicated in New York, per-pupil expenditures could be less 
than $3,700.  Even if one inflates this figure by fifty percent, it still amounts to 
saving of $1,834 per student.  For New York City alone, the savings could be 
$1.7 billion.  For the entire state, with 2.57 million students, the savings could 
amount to as much as $4.7 billion.34 
The studies that have been done comparing the cost of private to public 
education all point to the same conclusion:  the private sector can provide edu-
cation at a lower cost.  There are a number of reasons for this, but it all boils 
down to just one thing – different structures produce different results.  The 
government school system has a near monopoly, so it behaves like a monopo-
ly, providing less than excellent service at a cost that is higher than could exist 
under competitive conditions.  Monopolies have less pressure to cut costs than 
do competitive firms, so prices tend to be higher.  Furthermore, there is less 
incentive to improve quality under a monopoly regime because customers have 
nowhere else to go. 
Costs of providing a public education have gone up at a much faster rate 
than inflation,35 yet student scores on standardized tests have declined.36  Be-
tween 1970 and 1990, the cost per pupil increased by 489%, while inflation 
was 213%—a real increase of 88%.37  In some school districts, less than half 
of the people on the payroll actually do any teaching.38  Yet at many private 
schools, more than 90% of the people on the payroll are teachers.39 
 
 30. Id. at 126-135. 
 31. POOLE, supra note 25, at 136-146. 
 32. Id. at 147-157. 
 33. Id. at 158-171. 
 34. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Education, in PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK: 
COMPETING FOR A BETTER FUTURE 106-153 (1992). 
 35. POOLE, supra note 25, at 173. 
 36. GOODMAN, supra note 22, at 123.  See also Chubb & Moe, supra note 34, at 109, 115-
119. 
 37. Chubb & Moe, supra note 34, at 111. 
 38. GOODMAN, supra note 22, at 123. 
 39. POOLE, supra note 25, at 179. 
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A study by New York City’s Comptroller found that it cost $6,196 to edu-
cate one severely handicapped student in a government school, but private 
schools under contract with the city government could do the job for $4,730, a 
savings of $1,466, or 24%, if one uses the government schools cost as the 
base.40  A study by the New York State Senate determined that the total cost 
per pupil in a public school in 1990 was $4,929, which is about twice as much 
as the cost of educating a student in a Catholic school.41  The cost of educating 
a student in Boston rose from a little over $1,000 in 1971 to $4,000 in 1981, 
making it the second most expensive large school system in the country.42  By 
1985, the per pupil cost had risen to about $5,400.43  Yet its high school sen-
iors were scoring more than 200 points below average on the scholastic apti-
tude test,44 which shows that throwing money at the problem will not solve it.  
The problem is not with insufficient funds.  The problem is structural. 
Lower cost structures prevail in the private sector at all levels of education.  
A New York State Department of Education study found that disadvantaged 
students in educational opportunity programs could be graduated from private 
universities at much lower cost ($18,570) than students at government-run 
universities ($103,061), although public funds were used for both types of 
programs.45  In other words, private universities could do the job for 18% of 
the cost it would take to have it done by a government-run university. 
C.  Quality 
Quality cannot be measured, although it can be ranked.46  For example, 
Jane may prefer Pizza Hut pizza to the pizza that comes from the corner pizza 
parlor, but she cannot say that Pizza Hut pizza is 12% better than corner pizza.  
The perception of quality is also subjective.  Paul, and many others, probably 
prefer the pizza on the corner to Pizza Hut pizza.  If they did not, then it would 
not be long before the corner pizza parlor would go bankrupt for lack of busi-
 
 40. SAVAS, supra note 19, at 102.  This study was published in 1978.  The prices in both 
cases would likely be much higher today.  If one had to guess at the relative cost in current prices, 
it would not be unreasonable to expect that the private sector could save even more money, in 
percentage terms, since New York’s schools have become less efficient since 1978.  Office of the 
Comptroller, POLICY ANALYSES OF THE COST AND FINANCING OF SPECIAL EDUCATION TO 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY (1978), cited in SAVAS, supra 19, at 115, n. 44. 
 41. Chubb & Moe, supra note 34, at 111. 
 42. FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 139. 
 43. Id. 
 44. FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 139. 
 45. SAVAS, supra note 19, at 103. 
 46. One way to approximate the differences in quality between schools is to compare test 
grades that students at different schools earn on standardized exams.  This is only an approxima-
tion, since tests do not measure or test everything.  It is generally conceded that private schools 
provide a better education than public school.  See JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS 59-79 (1987). 
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ness, and Pizza Hut would have a monopoly.  Some people prefer one thing, 
and other people prefer another. 
The same is true of education.  Some people prefer one school or kind of 
education and some prefer another.  Some people would rather attend (or send 
their children to) a school that supports a multicultural approach to education 
and some prefer a straight Western civilization approach.  Some prefer a John 
Dewey approach47 and some prefer a fact-cramming approach.  Some prefer to 
have their children attend a school that is all white (or black) or all male (or 
female), and some would prefer a school that has a more diverse student body.  
Some parents would like to see the time spent in school expanded to ten hours 
a day or twelve months a year, and others prefer the status quo.  Some parents 
want their children to learn foreign languages, math, science, or whatever, and 
some would prefer a different curriculum that they think is more relevant.  
Some parents would prefer to send their children to a school that teaches reli-
gion and/or moral values, while others think that such things should be taught 
at home, or not at all.  Some parents would prefer to send their children to 
schools with cafeteria policies that meet certain religious requirements, but 
others do not see this as an issue of concern.48  There is no such thing as one 
best pizza, and there is no such thing as one best school., 
Forcing a standard curriculum and set of rules down everyone’s throats is 
bound to reduce the quality of the educational product, since quality is subjec-
tive and standardization requires compromise, yet that is exactly what happens 
in a government school system.  In some cases, standardization is required by 
law, i.e. no segregation, no religion.  In other cases, standardization is required 
so that the school can provide an educational product that most people will ac-
cept, even if it is suboptimum.  If Johnnie’s parents were to list twenty things 
that they wanted their child’s school to have, they might find that the local 
public school had only eight or nine of the items.  If Jane’s parents did the 
same thing, they might be able to check off seven things, or perhaps fifteen, 
depending on their own subjective values and requirements.  The local public 
school probably provides a number of things that either set of parents does not 
find of any value to their child, yet they must pay for these things even if they 
derive no benefit from their presence and availability. 
With a private system, schools will be able to offer diversified curricula 
and programs that will better satisfy the needs of educational consumers.  
Some schools will invest their limited resources in providing one basket of ed-
ucational products and some will choose a different basket of products.  
Schools that offer Latin and Greek will attract certain parents.  Schools that 
offer a strong math or science program will attract another set of consumers.  
 
 47. JOHN DEWEY, ON EDUCATION, 3 (Reginald B. Archambault ed., 1964). 
 48. In Bradford, England, for example, which has a high Moslem population, some parents 
insisted that the local schools prepare food based on Islamic rules. 
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Under a private, diverse system, consumers will be able to choose the school 
that supplies a basket of products that most closely approximates their needs.  
Johnnie’s and Jane’s parents may each be able to find a school that provides 
eighteen or nineteen of the things on their list if they take the time to shop 
around.  In this respect, shopping around for a school is no different than 
shopping around for a car.  You choose the one that best meets your needs 
within a certain price range.  Where there is choice, there is diversity because 
different people prefer different things. 
D.  The Effect of Minorities and the Poor 
One argument that has been raised against private education is that minori-
ties and the poor get left behind.  They cannot participate in the private system 
because they cannot afford it.  But such is not the case.  In California, there are 
more minorities in private schools than in the government schools.49  Private 
schools that provide high quality education can thrive in the inner city.  Ger-
trude Wilks proved it with her Nairobi Day School in East Palo Alto, Califor-
nia, a poor black neighborhood.50  Marva Collins proved it in inner-city Chi-
cago.51  Private schools that provide a high-quality, low-cost education have 
done well in numerous other places as well.52  So the argument that the poor 
and minorities would be abandoned under a private system does not hold up 
under analysis. 
Before the advent of public education, education was provided privately, 
Joseph Lancaster, a private schoolmaster in England, developed a system – the 
Lancaster system – which was a phenomenal success.53  His system enabled a 
vast number of students to receive personalized instruction at very low cost.  
He established a tutor system, by which some students would spend time tutor-
ing other students.54  The teacher would provide additional instruction as well 
as supervise the tutoring activity.  Using this method, one teacher would be 
able to educate a large number of students at a very low per pupil cost.  Those 
being tutored benefited because they received personalized instruction.55  The 
tutors also benefited because tutoring gave them some responsibility and rein-
forced what they already knew.  Lancaster established more than 100  schools 
 
 49. SAVAS, supra note 19, at 103, 138. 
 50. POOLE, supra note 25, at 185. 
 51. Marva Collins became disgusted with the public school system in Chicago, where she 
taught, so she started her own private school.  Students who could not afford the very low tuition 
were admitted for free.  Her students’ performance compare favorably to that of students in other 
schools, although they came from disadvantaged backgrounds.  MARVA COLLINS & CIVIA 
TAMARKIN, MARVA COLLINS’ WAY 17 (1982). 
 52. Chubb & Moe, supra note 34, at 145-146. 
 53. POOLE, supra note 25, at 177. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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in England and America between 1818 and 1850.56  He could educate so many 
students at such a low cost that he was able to admit the poorest children with-
out charging them any tuition.57  But public school bureaucracies did not like 
the Lancaster system, and a number of them banned the method.58 
The Lancaster system, or variations of it, has been making a comeback.  
The Loma Vista Elementary School in Palo Alto, California started using a 
variation of the Lancaster method in 1974 and improved third grade reading 
achievement from the 70th percentile to the 99th percentile.59 
Extensive use of the Lancaster method would reduce the need for teachers, 
since teachers could effectively teach a larger number of students.  This possi-
bility probably does not come as good news to the teacher unions.  But it is 
good news for taxpayers, who must pay the cost of a bloated public school sys-
tem.60 
E.  Weaknesses of the Utilitarian Approach 
The utilitarian approach suffers from several structural weaknesses.  Per-
haps the major weakness, from an economic point of view, is that it is impos-
sible to measure utility.  Relative utilities can be ranked but not quantified.  
Economic textbooks ignore this fact because it complicates their model-
building, but it is a very real weakness nonetheless.  For example, let’s say that 
Ken has the option of buying a hamburger or a hot dog for $1.  Eating the 
hamburger would increase his “utils”61 by eight.  Eating the hot dog would in-
crease his utils by six.  Parting with the dollar would decrease his utils by 
three.  Since he stands to gain by buying either the hamburger or hot dog – his 
positive utils exceed his negative utils – he will make a purchase.  Since his 
positive utility increases more by purchasing the hamburger, he will buy the 
hamburger and not the hot dog. 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. POOLE, supra note 25, at 177 (The New York City Education Department banned it in 
1846). 
 59. Id. at 178. 
 60. There are a number of ways that government schools can cut their costs.  Poole discusses 
some of these ways.  See id. at 176-183.  But the real problem is not that government schools are 
run inefficiently but that they are locked into a structure that they cannot replace.  As long as 
government schools hold a monopoly position, they will behave like monopolies.  It is inherent in 
the structure.  See also, Jack D. Douglas, Only Freedom of Education Can Solve America’s Bu-
reaucratic Crises of Education, 155 CATO INST. 1 (1991). 
 61. “Utils” is the measure of utility that economists use to illustrate the theory of marginal 
utility.  A util is the measure of benefit that someone derives from entering into a transaction.  For 
more on this point, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 260-268 (1970).  
Rothbard also discusses the weaknesses of the use of utils in economic analysis. 
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It should also be noted that marginal utility decreases with each additional 
purchase.62  After Ken eats a few hamburgers, you may have to pay him to eat 
one more because he would experience discomfort in doing so.  The point is, 
utility is not constant.  It shifts. 
It is not the same for every individual.  A vegetarian would experience 
negative utility from eating the first hamburger.  The main weakness from such 
analysis is that there is no way to measure the degree of utility.  We may be 
able to determine that Ken would prefer a hamburger to a hot dog, but we can-
not really say that he gains two additional utils by buying a hamburger because 
“utils” are imaginary units that economists use to make a point.  They do not 
exist in reality. 
How does all this relate to Brown v. Board of Education?  The analysis 
given above shows that providing education privately is cheaper and more cost 
effective than having government provide it.  Most economists would end the 
discussion at this point.  If private education increases utility more than tax-
supported education, then society benefits more by scrapping government 
schools and replacing them with private schools.  The argument is decided 
based on what is in the “public interest,” or which option is more beneficial to 
“society.” 
It is at this point that another weakness of the utilitarian approach – the 
greatest good for the greatest number —should be pointed out.  A “rights” the-
orist would be quick to point out that it is impossible to determine with any 
degree of confidence whether a particular policy is in the public interest.  We 
cannot measure positive and negative utils, so we cannot subtract the negative 
utils from the positive utils to determine whether the net result is positive or 
negative.  But more importantly, there is no such thing as a public interest; 
there are only private interests.  Any public interest, if there is one, is merely 
the sum of all the individual interests.  People have different values and inter-
ests, so we cannot really add and subtract them.  There is no such thing as the 
common good because individuals have different values.63  Therefore, the only 
proper function of government is to create a system of rules that allows indi-
viduals to pursue their own happiness, provided that their pursuit does not vio-
late the rights of others. 
In the field of education, we cannot say that it is the public interest to have 
free public education because society benefits.  Those who receive the free ed-
ucation benefit, but at the expense of those who must pay.  A rights advocate 
 
 62. This phenomenon is called the law of decreasing marginal utility, or the law of marginal 
utility.  Id. 
 63. MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 41 (1989). 
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would argue that no action is justified if one party to the transaction acts as a 
parasite by forcing someone else to pay for his benefit.64 
Utilitarians would argue that a policy should be undertaken if the good ex-
ceeds the bad; if the positive benefits exceed the cost or detriments, the great-
est good for the greatest number.  It is acceptable to violate some people’s 
rights as long as “society” benefits overall.  It is at this point that the weakness 
of the utilitarian approach becomes most clear. 
Let’s say that Mike has recently been released from prison after ten years 
incarceration.  He has not had any sex during that time and he has been over-
sexed ever since he was ten years old.  He comes upon a prostitute who is in a 
drunken stupor.  He rapes her.  She is barely able to perceive what is going on, 
but experiences slight disutility.  Mike, on the other hand, benefits greatly by 
the experience.  A utilitarian would say that the rape is in the public interest 
because society benefits.  Mike benefits a lot and the prostitute gives up prac-
tically nothing.  A rights advocate would say that rape is always wrong be-
cause someone’s rights are violated.  The fact that someone gains much and 
another loses little is completely irrelevant.  Gain and loss are not legitimate 
questions.  Only rights matter.  A rights advocate would argue that actions 
should be permitted if no one’s rights are violated and not permitted if some-
one’s rights are violated. 
IV.  A RIGHTS APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF EDUCATION 
The “Right” to an Education 
Where the government is responsible for providing its citizens with educa-
tion, it seems only fair that the service should be equally available to all.  It is 
this issue that the Brown case addressed, more or less, in holding that separate 
education could not be equal education.  But a threshold question needs to be 
asked first: Is there a “right” to an education in the first place?  The answer to 
this question depends on which view of rights one subscribes to – positive 
rights or negative rights.  Those who advocate positive rights (those granted by 
government), would argue that individuals have the right to a free education, 
adequate medical care, a job, decent housing, and so forth.65  The list goes on 
and on.  Those who espouse the negative rights view would argue that individ-
uals have the right to life (the right not be to killed), liberty (the right not to be 
confined) and property (the right not to have the fruits of their labor confiscat-
ed, either by an individual or by a majority).  Any other “rights” are not rights 
 
 64. Public Choice School economists have labeled this phenomenon “rent-seeking.”  See 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT-SEEKING (1989); THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988); TOWARD A 
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). 
 65. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). 
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at all, since granting a positive right to one individual requires violating the 
right of some other individual.66 
Negative rights are rights that come before government.  Governments are 
formed to protect these pre-existing rights.  Under a positive rights regime, 
governments are formed first, and then granted certain positive rights.  The fa-
tal flaw in the positive rights position is that, in order for one individual to 
have a positive right, the negative rights of another individual must be violat-
ed.  One person gains at the expense of another.  For example, if someone has 
the “right” to an education, someone else must provide it – the taxpayer.  If 
someone has the right to a job, someone must provide it – some employer.  
The same with health care or any other so-called right.  But under a negative 
rights regime, no one’s rights are violated.  No one gains at the expense of an-
other.  I have the right to life, and so do you.  I have the right to liberty and so 
do you.  I have the right to property and so do you.67  Under a positive rights 
regime, my right to property is disparaged because I am forced to pay for the 
education of your children, for your health care, and so forth.  A positive rights 
regime necessarily involves a win-lose, parasitical relationship, whereas a neg-
ative rights regime is always win-win.  Rights never conflict in a negative 
rights regime, whereas there are frequent conflicts in a positive rights regime. 
The negative rights regime and positive rights regime are incompatible.  
You either have one or the other.  One person either gains at the expense of 
someone else or not.  The paradigm is either win-win or win-lose.  The nega-
tive rights regime is superior to the positive rights regime because win-win sit-
uations are to be preferred to win-lose situations.  It is better that no one’s 
rights be violated than that rights are violated 50% of the time, which is the 
case in a positive rights regime. 
There is no right to an education, health care, a job, decent housing, or an-
ything else except life, liberty and property.  Therefore, speaking about the 
right to education is gibberish. 
V.  DISMANTLING THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY IN EDUCATION: THE CASE 
FOR FREEDOM 
A.  The Voucher Solution 
Educational vouchers shift the emphasis on education away from the state 
and toward the individual, away from central planning to a consumer-driven, 
 
 66. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 88-119, 178-179 
(1974)(exposition of the negative rights thesis).  In the author’s opinion, the negative rights thesis 
demolishes the positive rights view. 
 67. An early proponent of negative rights, also referred to as natural rights, was John Locke.  
See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4-5, 54 (1952). 
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market approach.68  In a traditional educational system, the government pro-
vides the schools and the children attend.  Usually, they attend the school that 
is closest to their home.  They have no choice in the matter.  In a voucher sys-
tem, each child receives a ticket or voucher equal to a certain cash equivalent 
that allows children to exchange the voucher for admission to the school of 
their (parents’) choice.  For example, if it costs a certain school district $5,000 
to educate each of the high school students in its district, a district on the 
voucher system would give each student of high school age a voucher entitling 
the child’s parents to purchase $5,000 worth of education at the school of their 
choice.  The school accepting the voucher could turn it into the school district 
in exchange for a $5,000 check.  If the parents want to send their child to a 
private school that cost $6,000, they could turn over the voucher and write out 
a check for the other $1,000.  If they can find a school that charges only 
$4,500, they could turn over the voucher and receive a $500 rebate, if the rules 
permitted it. 
A major advantage of a voucher system is that it immediately breaks the 
government school monopoly because it allows educational consumers to have 
a choice.  They can send their children to the school nearest to them, but they 
do not have to.  If they can find a better school that is willing to admit their 
son or daughter, the parents can abandon the school that they deem to be of 
inferior quality, thus upgrading the quality of their childrens’ education at no 
cost to them.  Schools would be forced to compete for students or face the pos-
sibility of closing.  Schools that do a better job of providing the education that 
parents want would increase enrollment.69 
Injecting market forces into education would have several other beneficial 
effects.  For one, schools would be more cost conscious.  There would be add-
ed incentive to cut costs and to spend money more efficiently, just like any 
other business.  The privatization literature points out numerous examples 
where the shift from governmentally provided services to the private sector 
can reduce costs by 20% to 50% or more, so it is not unreasonable to expect 
that the cost of providing education could drop drastically in a short period of 
 
 68. Numerous books and articles have been written about the various voucher systems that 
have been proposed and tried.  See, e.g., MILTON AND ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 158-
175 (1980); DAVID W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: A CASE FOR TUITION VOUCHERS 
(1990); ALAN MAYNARD, EXPERIMENT WITH CHOICE IN EDUCATION (1975); ARTHUR SELDON, 
THE RIDDLE OF THE VOUCHER (1986).  See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 
85-107 (1962)(one of the first suggestions of vouchers as a solution to the state’s education mo-
nopoly). 
 69. Vermont has been using a voucher system for years and the idea is gaining support.  As 
of 1984, 95 of Vermont’s 246 towns did not have a public school and did not belong to any of the 
state’s high school districts.  The government used vouchers to contract out the service to private 
schools.  GOODMAN, supra note 22, at 124, citing John McClaughry, Who Says Vouchers Won’t 
Work?, REASON 24-32 (January 1984). 
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time.70  If privatization of education causes costs to decline by 30%, then the 
local government would have to provide just $3,500 per student instead of 
$5,000, making the option of reducing taxes a real possibility. 
B.  Vouchers Are a Half-Way Measure 
Vouchers are only a half-way solution, a form of market socialism.71  
While educational vouchers would break the government monopoly on educa-
tion and enhance the quality of education while reducing its cost, vouchers are 
only a half-way measure.  The basic issue still remains – by what right does 
government force some people to pay for the education of other people’s chil-
dren?  Property rights are still being violated because the money that is used to 
provide vouchers comes from taxes – the forcible taking of property without 
the owner’s consent.72  With a voucher system, the government would still be 
involved in education.  There is always the possibility that, in order to be eli-
gible to receive vouchers, a school would have to comply with certain gov-
ernment requirements, which would defeat the whole purpose of vouchers. 
Another question is logically raised at this point.  Should we go to a totally 
private, non-tax-supported educational system immediately, or should a 
voucher system be instituted as an intermediate step, to be used until the gov-
ernment monopoly is broken?  Pragmatically, the voucher system seems to be 
the way to go.  Vouchers would allow private schools to replace government 
schools with a minimum of disruption.  But a voucher system would not solve 
the rights problem, because individuals are still being forced to pay for the ed-
ucation of other people’s children.  The pragmatic approach is utilitarian-based 
because it allows rights to be violated. 
From a rights perspective, there is only one correct answer.  Government 
schools should be abolished immediately and individuals should not be made 
to pay for the education of other people’s children for even one more day.  
Government must stop violating taxpayers’ rights to property immediately, not 
over some phase-in period. 
A similar argument was made against slavery in the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry.  Abolitionists argued that slavery should be abolished immediately regard-
less of consequences because individuals have the right to be free.  The argu-
ment that slaveowners might go out of business is irrelevant.  President 
Lincoln suggested that, as a compromise, slavery be abolished gradually, over 
 
 70. FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 17.  See also GOODMAN, supra note 22, at 119. 
 71. The two basic economic systems are socialism and capitalism.  Socialism exists when 
the means of production (schools in this case) are owned by the government.  Under capitalism, 
the means of production are privately owned.  Under fascism, the means of production are pri-
vately owned but heavily regulated, as was the case in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
 72. Philosophically, all taxation is theft, since it involves the taking of property without the 
owner’s consent.  The author will not delve into that issue here.  For a number of treatises on the 
ethics of tax evasion, see THE ETHICS OF TAX EVASION (Robert W. McGee ed. 1998). 
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a period of time.  But such compromise positions would allow rights to contin-
ue to be violated just because it is inconvenient or impractical to stop a rights-
violating practice overnight.  Many slaves would disagree with the position.  
And so would many taxpayers, who are being forced to pay for something that 
does not benefit them. 
The Supreme Court, in the Brown decision, addressed an important ques-
tion:  whether separate government schools can be equal.  But it missed the 
main point, which is whether some individuals should be forced to pay for the 
education of someone else’s children.  Maybe, after more than forty years, it is 
time to examine this question. 
